{"id":1203,"date":"2013-10-29T16:49:14","date_gmt":"2013-10-29T20:49:14","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/internetdistinction.com\/wsisimpacts\/?p=1203"},"modified":"2014-03-20T01:00:30","modified_gmt":"2014-03-20T05:00:30","slug":"hip-pocket-analysis-of-res-1305-internet-related-public-policy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/internetdistinction.com\/wsisimpacts\/2013\/10\/29\/hip-pocket-analysis-of-res-1305-internet-related-public-policy\/","title":{"rendered":"Hip Pocket Analysis of Res 1305: Internet-Related Public Policy"},"content":{"rendered":"

———- Forwarded message ———-
\nFrom: Seth Johnson
\nDate: Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 4:49 AM
\nSubject: Fwd: IPP: Hip Pocket Analysis of Res 1305: Internet-Related Public Policy
\nTo: “ITAC@LMLIST.STATE.GOV” , “Minard, Julian E” <\/p>\n

Attached please find the below commentary in Word and PDF formats
\nalong with the original Resolution 1305. With my apologies, please
\nuse these copies instead of the ones I sent within the last hour.
\nNotes on Annex to Res 1305<\/a><\/p>\n

(Revisions in a couple of places reflect my preference to use careful
\nlanguage treating the types of networks more even-handedly.)<\/p>\n

Seth<\/p>\n

On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 6:55 PM, Seth Johnson wrote:
\n> Hi all, there are actually a good many more “mandate” sources that one
\n> could list in the Res 1305 Annex’s second column. But I don’t think
\n> adding those would do much to add insight to the IPP group’s efforts.
\n>
\n> In the following, I offer comments on the IPP areas that can serve as
\n> the “hip pocket” analysis Paul suggested you’d want to bring. I’ll
\n> turn this into a pdf tomorrow, but for now, use the following text
\n> version.
\n>
\n> The following points are meant to present the point that the CWG may
\n> undermine their own purposes if they proceed to present this list of
\n> policy areas without recognizing the distinction between competing and
\n> interoperating providers creating an Internet, and networks that may
\n> be IP-based but are governed by a core authority that sets common
\n> policy across routers that it controls.
\n>
\n> The policy areas in the Annex fall into three sets:
\n>
\n> I) Items 4, 5, 6, 7, 11 and 12 are all cybersecurity-related. They
\n> cover security, safety, continuity, sustainability, and robustness,
\n> cybercrime, spam, misuse of the Internet, privacy and personal
\n> information, and protecting children online. These emphases reflect
\n> the points of Geneva Action Line C5, on “Building confidence and
\n> security in the use of ICTs.”
\n>
\n> The Cybersecurity resolutions generally speak in terms of \u201cICTs\u201d and
\n> \u201ctelecommunications\/ICTs,\u201d and only refer to the Internet, IP-based
\n> networks or Next-generation networks in a few instances. They use the
\n> term Internet in relation to spam and child online protection and in
\n> reference to these various areas as being Internet-related public
\n> policy areas within the scope of ITU, including Council Resolution
\n> 1305, which I am analyzing.
\n>
\n> Spam, child online protection, and general categories of concerns such
\n> as security, safety, continuity, sustainability, robustness, and
\n> misuse of the Internet, whether related to Internet resources such as
\n> domain names and addresses or more general concerns related to the
\n> Internet, can arguably be addressed by approaches that accord
\n> responsibility to end users or individual networks. Enforcement of a
\n> policy by a central authority across networks may have effects on the
\n> autonomy and liberty of end users and network providers and the
\n> flexibility of the platform produced when they interoperate.
\n>
\n> WTSA 50 and PP 130 refer to work being undertaken by ITU-T Study Group
\n> 17 on \u201cNational IP-based Public Network Security Centers.\u201d IP-Based
\n> networks constituted of routers that are under a core policy or
\n> authority can implement security measures in ways that are very
\n> different from the kinds of approaches that may be taken among
\n> autonomous, competing providers interoperating through the use of IP.
\n> If confidence and security policies depend on forms of oversight like
\n> those available within a managed service framework, the platform that
\n> results will be subject to those policies rather than relying on the
\n> participants in the network providing for the same purposes
\n> themselves.
\n>
\n> No distinction is made in the ITU framing documents between these two
\n> types of networks. Proceeding with implementing public policy for
\n> confidence and security without recognizing the nature of the Internet
\n> as distinct from an intranet that may transmit packets in specialized
\n> ways among the routers it controls, will not only impact the nature of
\n> the platform, but it will affect numerous WSIS goals.
\n>
\n>
\n> 2) Items 2, 8, 9 and 10 are more “developmental.” Items 9 and 10, on
\n> “Developmental aspects of the Internet” and “capacity building for
\n> Internet governance in developing countries,” both reference WTDC
\n> Resolutions 17 and 20. Given that WTDC 17 is cited by Plenipotentiary
\n> Resolution 137, which promotes “next-generation network deployment in
\n> developing countries,” we can easily see that failing to distinguish
\n> the special characteristics of the Internet while addressing policy on
\n> “developmental aspects of the Internet” will easily encourage the
\n> implementation of NGNs without recognizing the difference. WTDC 20
\n> addresses non-discriminatory access to telecom facilities and
\n> applications as well as the pursuit of partnerships, and is referenced
\n> by WTDC Resolutions in the areas of the enabling environment, capacity
\n> building and digital inclusivity and ICT applications in general.
\n> While non-discriminatory access is a critical value, competition among
\n> autonomous providers can serve these same purposes through a flexible
\n> and open Internet platform, supporting infrastructure development,
\n> empowerment of communities and sustainability and diversity of
\n> applications on a stronger basis. Non-discrimination policy is more
\n> applicable to intranet offerings or a vertically integrated
\n> telecommunications context, and cannot offer the advantages of real
\n> competition among independent providers producing an Internet
\n> platform.
\n>
\n> Item 2, on International Internet Connectivity, does not list WTDC 23
\n> under the ITU mandate column. This should be added and it should be
\n> pointed out that the provision under “recognizing” should add language
\n> that recognizes that not all commercial practices to reduce costs are
\n> associated with the general purpose transmissions of packets that
\n> enable independent networks to interoperate. Connectivity to the
\n> broader international Internet does not necessarily mean the network
\n> at the national level supports general purpose internetworking between
\n> autonomous network providers:
\n>
\n> Adding one paragraph to WTDC 23
\n> (internetdistinction.com\/wsisimpacts\/wsis\/wtdc\/wtdc_23\/ )
\n>
\n> recognizing
\n> a) that commercial initiatives by service providers have the
\n> potential to deliver cost savings for Internet access, for example
\n> through the development of more local content and the optimization of
\n> Internet traffic routing patterns in a manner that provides for a
\n> greater proportion of traffic to be routed locally;
\n>
\n> b) that charging principles for international Internet
\n> connectivity must recognize that some commercial initiatives by
\n> providers of international connectivity to the broader Internet may
\n> take the form of practices within their networks that must be
\n> distinguished from Internet connectivity, notwithstanding cost
\n> advantages of these practices, since they are not consistent with the
\n> flexible mode of interoperability among competitive, autonomous
\n> Internet providers that the Internet protocols make possible,
\n> <\/Add>
\n>
\n> Item 8, on “availability, affordability, reliability, and quality of
\n> service, especially in the developing world,” references values that
\n> are often offered as advantages that managed or specialized service
\n> network frameworks make possible. The ITU will easily misrepresent
\n> the nature of the open Internet platform if it does not distinguish it
\n> from specialized service offerings.
\n>
\n>
\n> 3) And Items 1 and 3 fit are “more technical,” addressing
\n> internationalized domain names and international public policy issues
\n> pertaining to Internet resources such as domain names and addresses.
\n> Under this heading, WTSA 47 and 48 note in connection with ccTLDs and
\n> IDNs that intergovernmental organizations have had and should continue
\n> to have a role in coordination of Internet-related public policy
\n> issues, and that international organizations have had and should
\n> continue to have a role in development of Internet-related technical
\n> standards and relevant policies. WTSA 49, on ENUM, valorizes
\n> convergence in reference to the integration of telecommunications and
\n> the Internet. WTSA 64 refers to IP addresses as fundamental resources
\n> key to the development of IP-based networks and the world economy.
\n>
\n> For these resolutions, we simply note that networks do not necessarily
\n> afford the key characteristics and advantages of the Internet simply
\n> by dint of their using IP addresses, and it is critical to recognize
\n> that the Internet addresses the problem of interoperating between
\n> autonomous networks, while other types of IP-based networks seek to
\n> implement functions that do not use the Internet Protocol in this way.
\n>
\n>
\n> That’s it! I didn’t go into specific impacts on WSIS purposes so
\n> much, but the point should be plain: that it doesn’t serve the ITU or
\n> the WSIS project well to fail to recognize how the Internet is unique.
\n> The oversight can be shown to directly undermine numerous values that
\n> the WSIS ostensibly supports.
\n>
\n>
\n> Seth
\n